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IARTICLES J
PARTNERSHIP REORGANIZATIONS: A NEW
TAX FRONTIER
By MILTON A. DAUBER *
THE history of taxation of partnerships has been largely the history of the
conflict between fundamental theories as to the very nature of a partnership.
The two theories are as well known to general commercial lawyers as to tax
specialists; and, indeed, perhaps better known to the former. One is the "entity"
theory, holding that the partnership is a jural entity having much the same
relationship to the partners as a corporation does to its shareholders. This was
the civil law notion, and was brought into our jurisprudence through application
of the law merchant.1 The "aggregate" theory, on the other hand, disregards
the partnership itself as anything more than a shorthand way of denoting a whole
series of special relationships between a group of individuals associated together
in a business venture.' This is the common law approach, and it largely domi-
nated both legislative and judicial thinking prior to 1954. In that year Congress
compromised the dispute.
It can safely be said that Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, dealing with taxation of partnerships, has put the two conflicting theories
themselves into partnership. The "aggregate" theory clearly dominates the rules
dealing with taxation of partnership income.' On the other hand, the "entity"
theory was chosen as the polestar for taxation of a partner's disposition 'of his
interest in the firm.4
If a partnership is an entity for purposes of sale, exchange or disposition,
it is immediately necessary that there be rules dealing with the reorganization
question. It is well settled policy with regard to corporations that those read-
justments in the form of a business which do not materially affect its continuity,
and the continuity of interest of the shareholders therein, should give rise to no
* A.B., New York University; LL.B., Harvard; Lecturer in Law of Taxation, Graduate
Division, New York University Law School; Partner in Firm of Carpenter, Bennett & Morrissey,
Newark and Jersey City, New Jersey.
I For complete discussion of historical materials see LITTLE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
PARTNERSHIPS, §§ 1.3, 1.4.
2 Ibid., § 1.4.
3 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 701, 702; Regs. §§ 1.702-1, 1.702-2; SEN. REP. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 376 ff. (1954).
4 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 741; Regs. § 1.741.1.
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tax consequences.' This rule is equally beneficial to taxpayer and government,
since it operates not only to defer taxation of "paper" gain but as well to defer
allowance of "paper" loss. The 1954 Code gives nodding recognition to the
applicability of this policy as regards partnerships. Section 708 embodies rules
which may fairly be described as embryonic prototypes of a system of partnership
reorganization principles. The rules, however, are so sketchy as to portend un-
intended and unrealistic tax consequences; and a brief legislative history, which
does little more than recite the statutory language, shows a lack of congressional
grasp of the implications of the reorganization problem.,
Similarly, the Advisory Group on Subchapter K, reporting to the House
Ways and Means Committee, gave no attention to any major problem in the
reorganization area. The committee recommended only two minor changes,
neither going to the heart of the policy problems underlying partnership read-
justment.' The legal writers have also ignored this area of tax law.
A complete technical analysis of the operation of section 708 and its rela-
tionship to the other parts of Subchapter K would be inappropriate here. This
article will treat certain major problems, both operational and in terms of fiscal
policy, which are raised by section 708.
All "reorganizations" fall into three basic classifications: first, a mere
adjustment of continuing interests in a single business; second, a consolidation
of two or more separate businesses; and third, the split-up of an existing business
into two or more separate units. Section 708 in fact recognizes and deals with
each of these types of reorganization.
ADJUSTMENT WITHIN A SINGLE FIRM
From the standpoint of continuity in reorganization, the significant partner-
ship concept is that of "termination." When a partnership terminates, tax
consequences ensue to partner and firm alike. Partners may realize taxable gain
or sustain taxable loss;8 the assets of the firm may change basis;9 the taxable
year of the firm is automatically ended,"° and partners may as a result thereof
suffer bunching of income.1 Hence, a statutory provision which excludes "ter-
mination" on the happening of a certain event in effect recognizes that the event
does not interrupt continuity of the enterprise.
5 See, e.g., Regs. § 1.368-1(b).
6 See SEN. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 388 (1954); H. R. CONF. REP. No. 2543,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1954).
Revised Report on Partners and Partnerships, 20 (U. S. Gov't. Printing Office, 1957).
8 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 731; Regs. § 1.708-1(b)(1)(iv).
9INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §732(b), (c).
'0 Regs. § 1.708-1(b) (1) (iii).
'lINT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 706(a). This would result, of course, only if the partner and
the firm have differing taxable years (see, e.g., Anne Jacobs, 7 T.C. 1481 (1946)), a situation now
generally forbidden. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 706(b).
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As a general matter, changes of interest resulting from transactions between
the firm as such and one or more of its members do not lead to a "termination;"
i.e., such changes do not affect the continuity of the firm and its tax attributes.
This is implicit in the statute and is made clear by the Regulations, which provide
that neither the admission and contribution of property by a new partner, nor the
liquidation of an existing partner's interest, effects a termination."
There can be little criticism of these rules. Neither an entry nor a with-
drawal constitutes any real change in the nature of the remaining partner's
interest; it remains in solution, and the gain or loss (if any) is unrealized. The
clear analogy is to the case where a corporation liquidates the interest of one
shareholder, thereby increasing the proportionate interest of the others. The eco-
nomic change is entirely potential, and there is no warrant for a change in the
partners' tax climate.'3
When we turn to the question of the sale of a partnership interest, the
treatment of partnerships diverges sharply from that afforded corporations.
Section 708 provides that if fifty per cent or more of the total interest in partner-
ship capital and profits is sold within a twelve month period the firm terminates."
The Regulations make it clear that it is immaterial whether the transfer of the
requisite fifty per cent interest be accomplished through a single sale or through
a series of sales within the twelve month period." It is equally immaterial
whether the sales be related or unrelated, whether the interests sold belonged
to one partner or several, and whether the selling partner or partners have even
disposed of their entire interest in the firm." Upon the date when the fifty per
cent mark is passed the firm must end. As will be seen this rule is at once
inadequate to its purpose, arbitrary in its operation and unwise from a policy
standpoint.
Both the inadequacy and the arbitrariness result in large part from the fact
that while a sale of fifty per cent or more of the partnership interests imposes
tax consequences, a change in ownership resulting from liquidation of the same
interests, accompanied by the entry of new members through contribution, would
preserve the firm's continuity. There seems to be no reason in policy why this
difference should exist, and there certainly is no provision of Subchapter K which
"2Regs. § 1.708-1(b) (1) (ii).
1
3 E.g., Holsey v. C.I.R., 258 F. 2d 865 (3d Cir. 1958).
l INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 708(b) (1) (B). The phrase -50 per cent or more of the total
interest in capital and profits" requires the percentage of each type of interest sold to be separately
calculated. A sale of 50% interest in capital, and a 49% interest in profits, does not result in
termination. Regs. § 1.708-1 (b) (1) (ii).
15 Regs. § 1.708-1(b) (1) (iii) (b).
16 Cf. Regs. § 1.708-1(b)(1)(ii).
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would expressly prohibit taxpayers from choosing either a sale or liquidation-
cum-contribution as might best suit their interests. "
If, in fact, the parties had been so ill-advised as to negotiate a sale between
a partner and an outsider and then at the last minute merely switch the form, it
might be possible to treat the case as a sale in fact. But there are many situations
in which no such construction can be imposed upon the parties. For example,
suppose that the original partnership agreement prohibited sale of any interest,
so that liquidation, and contribution by a new partner, is the only means available
under state law to effect a transfer of ownership. Although the Regulations
obliquely suggest that no such circuitous arrangement for sale will be recognized
as anything but a sale,18 there must remain serious doubt as to the Commissioner's
power to prevent the parties from successfully choosing their own form, and,
therefore, their own tax consequences.
It must also be noted that Subchapter K holds out added bait, in addition to
non-termination, to cast the deal as a liquidation, rather than a sale. If there
is a sale at a time when the firm holds "unrealized receivables" or "substantially
appreciated inventory" (as broadly defined in the "collapsible partnership" pro-
visions of section 751) ,1 the selling partner will pay an ordinary income tax on
the gain attributable to these items; yet ordinarily no one, and in rare cases
only the purchaser, will derive the normal tax benefit of a step-up in basis on
such assets."0 On the other hand, if the firm pays out the retiring partner in cash
as a liquidating dividend, the firm will obtain a stepped up basis for the retiring
partner's proportionate interest in inventory assets (but not unrealized receiv-
ables), which basis will operate for the benefit of all remaining partners. 2' The
retiring partner, of course, will generally be unable to avoid ordinary income tax
on his pro rata share of unrealized receivables and inventory appreciation.
The Advisory Group have noticed this problem in a limited way. They
propose that any sale of a partnership interest between the partners is to be
treated as a liquidation for the purposes of section 708, provided only that the
purchasing partner or partners have been members of the firm for at least a year.22
As the Advisory Group state, the disparity of treatment between liquidation on
the one hand and sale to the remaining partners on the other places too much
17 Thus, if partner A of firm ABC, owning a 50% interest, sold to D, the firm would terminate.
But if the firm liquidated A's interest, and D concurrently joined the partnership by making a
capital contribution, there would be no termination.
18 Cf. Regs. § 1.731-1(c)(3).
19 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 751 (c), (d).
20 This benefit will be afforded to the purchaser only if (1) an election is made by the firm
under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 743 and 754, or (2) there is a distribution of property other
than money to the purchaser. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 732(d).21
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§736(b)(2)(A), 751(b)(2)(B); Regs. §§1.736-1(a)(2),
1.75 1-1 (b) (4) (ii).z220p. Cit. supra, note 7.
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emphasis on form. As noted above, the opportunities for formal manipulation
are also present in the case of an intended sale to an outsider. It would, there-
fore, appear that both sales and liquidations should be treated the same in all
cases. It appears to the author that the "liquidation" rule should be extended,
and that sale of a substantial partnership interest should not generally result in
termination of the firm.
There are excellent reasons why the sale of a substantial interest in the firm
should not work a termination. These reasons arise from the operation of the
gain, loss and basis provisions of Subchapter K.
The Regulations under section 708 very sensibly provide that, when the
firm is deemed terminated by sale or exchange of interests, a constructive liquida-
tion distribution takes place, followed by a recontribution to the firm by the
remaining partners and the purchaser." The implications of such a constructive
liquidation, however, seem undesirable. Gain will be recognized to the distribu-
tee partners to the extent that money distributed exceeds their bases for their
interests.2 4 Hence, there is a possibility of recognition of gain to the continuing
partners, even though they have received no actual gain, even though the business
in fact continues as before, and even though under state law they may be
prohibited from making any actual withdrawal of money from the firm.
Secondly, upon liquidation, the firm's assets may acquire a new basis, and
in any event there may be serious complexity in computing basis for the "new"
firm. When assets are distributed in kind upon liquidation, inventory items and
unrealized receivables retain, in the hands of the distributee, the same basis as in
the hands of the firm; but all other property obtains a basis consisting in the
aggregate of the remaining basis of the partners for their interest." Thus, if
assets are constructively distributed at a time when the aggregate basis to the
members for their interests falls short of the firm's aggregate basis, there will be
an unwarrantable decrease in basis to the new firm. Similarly, if aggregate basis
of the members for their interests exceed the firm's aggregate basis for properties,
there-will be an unwarrantable increase in basis to the new firm. The result is
undesirable in either case, since the business continues as before and there is no
justification to increase or decrease depreciation, gain or loss on capital assets,
or other tax items.
And even where there is no change in aggregate basis, but different partners
have different bases, unnecessary administrative complexity is introduced. Pre-
23 Regs. § 1.708-1 (b) (1) (iv).
24INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 731(a)(1). It should be noted that, here as elsewhere in Sub-
chapter K, a reduction of the partner's share of partnership debts is treated as a distribution of
money to him. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 752(b).2 5
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 732(b), (c).
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sumably, on the constructive distribution in liquidation under section 708, each
asset is distributed to all partners, as tenants in common. Hence, the basis for
each asset will depend upon an analysis of the basis, in the hands of each partner,
of his fractional share of the asset. In a firm which owns a large number of
depreciable assets, and has a large number of partners, the paperwork would
discourage even the most resolute accountant. And, reconstitution of basis
through such an analysis will introduce fractional differences which could actu-
ally result in changing basis of the various assets in the hands of the new firm,
even though their aggregate basis remains the same.
It is true, of course, that the present operation of section 708 serves to bring
about a measure of simple justice for the purchasing partner which, as a practical
matter, is not otherwise available. Unless the firm enters into the highly uncer-
tain and virtually irrevocable election to adjust basis, provided by sections 743
and 754, the transferee will not be allowed any tax benefit for the fact that his
purchase price valued firm assets at fair market value, rather than at adjusted ba-
sis in the hands of the firm. However, the constructive liquidation provisions of
the section 708 Regulations give him this benefit through application of the basis
adjustment provisions of section 732(d).26 Yet obviously, the proper remedy
for this situation is to rewrite the optional adjustment sections, as proposed by
the Advisory Group, rather than to continue the present termination rule of
section 708.
Finally, present law permits limited opportunities for the manufacture of
capital losses which, while dubious, are at the least not expressly foreclosed. In
the case of a liquidation, where no assets are distributed other than money, inven-
tory property, and unrealized receivables, loss is recognized to the extent that the
money and the basis to the firm of the other property fall short of the partner's
basis for his interest.27 Thus, where non-inventory property is of limited impor-
tance, it would seem possible for the firm to sell such property pro rata to its
continuing partners at a low price prior to sale of interests to outsiders, so as to
create the potential for loss on the constructive distribution. Subsequently, of
course, the partners will recontribute the property, and business will go on as
usual.
It is true that the foregoing device is subject to attack as a sham, but the
point is not whether such a device, either in its raw form or suitably attired in
sheep's clothing, would succeed or fail. The point is that a rule which involves
the potentiality for loss development of this character is suspect. Obviously,
26 This would vary the limitation on basis of receivables and inventory in his hands, giving
them a new basis equal to fair market value. It is clear that INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 732(d) is
applicable to such a constructive distribution. See Regs. § 1.708-1 (b) (1) (iv).
2 7
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 731(a) (2).
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application of the continuity of interest rule which obtains when a partner's
interest is liquidated will forestall anything of this nature.
PARTNERSHIP CONSOLIDATION
The provisions of section 708 dealing with partnership consolidation are
deceptively simple. The statute briefly provides that in the case of merger or
consolidation the resulting firm will be treated as a continuation of any previous
partnership whose partners own an interest greater than fifty per cent in capital
and profits of the successor. 8 The Regulations, foreseeing the possible merger
of brother-sister partnerships, placed a gloss on these provisions which, though
not justified by anything in statutory language, is unfortunately in accordance
with the underlying Congressional intent. The Regulations provide that in such
case, where, by application of the "fifty per cent rule," the successor could be
considered a continuation of more than one of the merging or consolidating
partnerships, the successor will be considered the continuation of only that part-
nership which contributed the greatest dollar value of assets to the merger.29
But the Commissioner reserves to himself the right to "permit otherwise." "0
There are a number of insistent questions raised by this statutory scheme.
The first is a liminal problem of definition. What transactions will qualify as
a merger or consolidation? The complexities of this question may be shown by a
few elementary examples.
Firm A has five partners and conducts two distinct businesses. Firm B is
considerably smaller and conducts yet a third business.
(1) Four of the five members of Firm A desire to retire. The remaining
partner pays them out in cash by way of liquidation. Shortly thereafter he be-
comes a partner in Firm B, contributing both of the previous businesses of Firm A
and receiving a fifty-one per cent interest in capital and profits of Firm B. If this
is a merger then A is the continuing partnership, and B is deemed liquidated. On
the other hand, if this is not a merger then B is the continuing partnership and
A is deemed liquidated.
(2) The five members of Firm A desire to split up. All of the assets are
sold and three of the partners receive a liquidating distribution consisting of cash.
The remaining partners then join forces with Firm B, obtaining a fifty-one per
cent interest therein. Is this a merger?
(3) The five members of Firm A decide to split up. Three of the partners
receive a liquidation distribution consisting of all business assets and continue
28
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 708(b) (2) (A).




to operate both businesses as a new firm. The two remaining partners, who
retain an interest only in cash and securities, then join Firm B, obtaining a fifty-
one per cent interest therein. Is this a merger?
(4) The five members of Firm A decide to split up. The three retiring
members sell their interests to the remaining two who thereupon join Firm B,
taking a fifty-one per cent interest. Is this a merger of the original Firm A, or
should it be treated as a termination of Firm A by sale, followed by mere entry
of new members into Firm B as a continuing firm?
(5) Should it make a difference in any of the foregoing examples if the
plan for entry of personnel from Firm A into Firm B predates or postdates
the plan for readjustment in Firm A? "
The issues are, of course, impossible of any clear resolution under the
present provisions of Subchapter K.
It is well enough to use the simple word "merger" in connection with the tax
consequences of a corporate reorganization, since there is a whole body of state
law defining the term "merger" as applied to corporations; but the idea of a
"merger" of partnerships is a common law anomoly. Under state law the con-
solidation of two firms would be treated as the dissolution of both and the forma-
tion of a third partnership.12 Hence, in attempting to transfer tax concepts in
reorganization from the corporation to the partnership field, Congress should
have more clearly defined the types of partnership consolidations and rearrange-
ments which should, and which should not, be entitled to reorganization treat-
ment.
Some of the questions requiring decision are suggested by the foregoing
examples. Does a merger or consolidation require a plan, and if so, when and
by whom must the plan be adopted? Should a merger be permitted in the case
where only one partner of a predecessor firm is a member of the combined
organization ? Is it necessary that the merged firm continue all or a substantial
part of the business of each predecessor? Can you have a merger where the
actual business of one of the predecessors is continued by others? Should you
have reorganization tax consequences where the "continuing" members, as in
examples 2 and 3, have in fact transmuted their interest in the former business
into cash and have embarked that cash on a new business?
It is possible to answer some of these questions by mechanical application
of the rules of Subchapter K (e. g., by applying both the partnership division
31 In this connection, consider the rule that a partnership terminates if no part of its business,
operations or financial ventures continues to be carried on by any partner in the partnership form.
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 708(b)(1).
32 40 AM. JuR. Partnership § 242(1942).
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rules and the partnership merger rules simultaneously) or by resolving the total
transaction into a series of transactions, each of which has its own consequences
under Subchapter K. (E. g., treating the split up as a simple liquidation insofar
as the partners entering the merger are concerned.) But the questions here dis-
cussed go to the heart of tax policy, because they arise out of transactions which
frequently will occur as an integrated whole. Congress should examine the
policy implications of the integrated transaction and should give us an answer
that is responsive to the total situation, rather than an answer which can be
constructed by artificial examination of the parts.
The next question raised by the merger provisions of section 708 is one of
determining the implications of "continuation" of the previous partnership.
The only implication pointed out by the Regulations-and as we shall see the
one implication which dominated congressional thinking-is that the new firm
shall use the taxable year of the predecessor whose existence is deemed to con-
tinue.3" The other implications, however, come readily to mind. Naturally,
the bases of properties received from the continuing predecessor remain un-
changed. Presumably, its method of accounting and all of its elections with
regard to accounting carryover. Presumably also, the bases of the partners for
their interests remain the same with appropriate adjustments. We suppose that
they may also carry forward, against profits of the new firm, losses of the old
which have been held in abeyance by reason of section 704(d).
We come finally to the question of why the continuity of interest principle
has been so narrowly applied to partnership mergers. Here a continuity of
interest of at least fifty per cent is required, but only the persons owning that
continuing interest enjoy the benefits or bear the burdens of continuity. And,
in a case where two brother-sister partnerships qualify as continuing firms after
consolidation, the partners can enjoy the benefits or bear the burdens of con-
tinuity as to only one of the predecessors.
This is in sharp contradistinction to the situation under Subchapter C.
There, of course, continuity of ownership interest is prerequisite to a reorganiza-
tion. Yet once it is found, all parties to the reorganization enjoy tax free status
and all bring forward most of their critical tax attributes. If, for example,
General Motors and Chrysler should merge, it is undoubted that the basis of
the properties received from both by the combined corporation would carry over,
that the operating losses of both would continue to be available 14 and that all
shareholders would exchange their stock tax free and without a change in
basis. 5 Yet if General Motors and Chrysler were partnerships, this would all
33 Regs. § 708-1(b) (2) (i).
34 Cf. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 381.
35 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 354, 358.
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change. Assuming that all "partners" in both firms remained as partners in the
consolidated firm, the former General Motors "partners" would undoubtedly
own more than a fifty per cent interest in the new enterprise. Consequently,
Chrysler would be deemed to have terminated. As a result, a "partner" in
Chrysler would have suffered a constructive distribution with possible recogni-
tion of gain. The basis of Chrysler's assets would be subject to change, if the
aggregate basis of the "partners" either exceeded or fell short of aggregate firm
basis for the properties; and there would be the same administrative difficulties
in determining the new basis of Chrysler's assets as has been discussed above in
connection with termination of a partnership through sale. Finally, past loss
experience of Chrysler would be wiped out.
There seems no justification for such a striking difference in tax results
between two transactions with essentially the same economic impact; but there
appears to be an explanation for the difference. The explanation is to be found
in history.
The genesis of corporate reorganization legislation was the problem of
taxing the shareho lder on the exchange of stocks in a merger or consolidation. 6
Aside from basis, the operating problems for the corporations received attention
of the Congress at a later date, and it was not until the enactment of section 381
of the 1954 Code that full legislative attention was given to the operating
consequences of a merger or other reorganization.
On the other hand, the specific problem which apparently evoked section
708 of the 1954 Code was an operating problem, rather than one of recognition
of gain on exchange. In the years immediately preceding 1954 the courts were
grappling with the issue of the tax consequences of dissolution of a partnership
under state law, and particularly the effect of such dissolution on the taxable
year of the firm. 7 As a consequence, most of the problems implicit in terminat-
ing or continuing a partnership were apparently not considered, and the provi-
sions of section 708 are manifestly directed to, and responsive to, only this one
problem.
Congressional preoccupation with the taxable year question explains some
of the seeming inconsistencies in section 708. It explains, principally, why the
Regulations are correct in asserting that only one of two or more consolidating
partnerships can be treated as the survivor. It is obvious that if more than one
firm is deemed to have survived there will be an embarrassing choice of taxable
year where the firms have different accounting periods. And if we probe beneath
36 E.g., Marr v. United States, 268 U.S. 536 (1925).
3
TE.g., Samuel Mnookin, 12 T.C. 744 (1949), a/I'd 184 F. 2d 89 (8th Cir. 1950), N.A.
1949-2 C.B. 4, withdrawn and acq. 1953-2 C.B. 5. The Commissioner, in 1953, adopted the princi-
ple now contained in INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 706(c)(1), R.R. 144, 1953-2 C.B. 212.
[VOL. 64
PARTNERSHIP REORGANIZATIONS
the surface there may also be other conflicts of tax attributes, principally account-
ing methods and accounting elections. These choices can be, and were, neatly
side-stepped by deciding that only one firm may survive. In the simple case of a
merger between a "big" firm and a "small" one, section 708 is undoubtedly
adequate to solve this one particular problem in accordance with the realities.
Yet here is a rule which, as pointed out above, may operate to produce
unjustified tax upon the partners notwithstanding that their interests continue
in solution, and may also work to permit unjustified tax advantages such as a
step-up in basis. Perhaps the better solution would be to treat all the merging
partnerships as continuing to the extent that their members retain a substantial
continuity of interest in the successor and perhaps as well only where there is
a substantial continuity of the business as such. In the case of conflicting tax
attributes, however, those of the partnership making the largest contribution
of assets to the new firm would prevail. Conflict of tax attributes is certainly a
problem, but it scarcely affords any reason to abandon the commendable effort
to avoid taxable events in the case of a mere modification of the business
structure.
DIVISIVE REORGANIZATION
The divisive reorganization provisions of section 708 start out down the
right road. It is generally provided that, in the case of the division of a partner-
ship, all resulting partnerships shall be considered a continuation of the common
"ancestor" firm. But this broad rule is quickly, and unfortunately, qualified by
a proviso: it is made applicable only to those successor firms whose members
in the aggregate owned more than fifty per cent interest in capital and profits
of the original partnership. 8 Any other resulting firm will be considered as a
new partnership. The Regulations provide further that any partner of the
original firm who does not become a member of a firm which is deemed a con-
tinuation thereof shall be treated as though his interest were liquidated. 9
The statute clearly provide t, and the Regulations recognize, that more than
one firm can qualify as a contin iation of the common "ancestor" in the case of
a division." This presents no ( ifficulty or embarrassment, inasmuch as there is
no problem of conflicting tax attributes, such as occurs upon consolidation of
partnerships. There was, then, nothing to impede Congress or the Commis-
sioner in following generally accepted reorganization principles, as found in the
corporate area. It may only be noted that this easy acceptance of multiple con-
tinuity highlights the probable source of the contrary rule in the case of partner-
ship mergers.
8 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §708(b)(2)(B).3 9 Regs. § 1.708-1(b) (2) (ii).
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Yet notwithstanding this feature, the divisive reorganization provisions
remain essentially unsatisfactory. Again, there seems to be no reason why the
fifty per cent rule should be imposed. Assume a corporation with five share-
holders, each owning a twenty per cent interest. The corporation conducts two
businesses. The parties decide to separate their interests, and to this end one
of the businesses is transferred to a newly formed subsidiary. The stock of this
new corporation is then distributed to two of the five shareholders, in exchange
for all of their stock in the original company. There is no tax consequence of
any kind. The provisions of section 355 operate here in recognition of the fact
that a spin-off of this nature has essential reorganization characteristics." As a
consequence, there is neither gain nor loss recognized, 2 nor any material change
in the tax attributes of the severed businesses.4 This is as it should be.
But assume instead that there was no corporation, and that the five parties
in interest were members of a partnership. The tax consequences change radi-
cally. The business which, after reorganization, is owned by the three "majority"
partners will be treated as a continuing entity. The two "minority" partners,
who take the "spin-off" business, however, will be treated as though they had
liquidated their interests and started in business anew. As noted above, if they
sustain either gain or loss it will be recognized, the basis of properties used in
the "spin-off" business may change, loss carry-overs may be terminated. And,
if disproportionate distributions are made, either of "inventory" items or of
"other property," even the three members of the "continuing" firm may be
affected. Depending upon which type of property is distributed to the retiring
members in excess of their pro rata interest therein, the "continuing" firm may
either sustain ordinary income by virtue of a constructive "sale" of inventory,4
or may obtain a step-up in basis on inventory as the result of a constructive
"purchase" thereof. "5
Obviously, there is no warrant for any such divergency in treatment between
business readjustments which differ only as to legal form. And the corporate
rule would seem by far the better one.
Policy considerations aside, section 708(b) (2) (B) has serious operational
problems as well. Definitional difficulties are not too great, since it is much
40 Ibid.
41 Regs. § 1.355-3.
42 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 355(a) (1), (2).
43 See, as to basis, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 362 (a); as to carry-over of earnings and profits,
Regs. § 1.312-10.
4See Regs. § 1.751-1 (b) (2) (3).
45 The same effect would, of course, occur with respect to unrealized receivables, but for
the special rules of INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 736, dealing with "payments" to a retiring partner.
"Payments" may be thought to include property other than money; and there is no express warrant
to exclude § 736 as a factor in a liquidation under Regs. § 1.708-1(b) (2) (ii).
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easier to define the concept of a partnership "division" than of a partnership
"merger." Consider, however, the problem inherent in the following situation.
The firm of ABCD conducts a retail appliance business and also performs service
work for customers. At some point along the line C and D, the "minority"
partners, decide to take over the service business while also retaining an interest
in the sales business. Accordingly, it is agreed that they will reduce their in-
terests in the sales business to, respectively, five per cent each and will take over
the assets of the service business, including its good will. What are the re-
organization consequences?
This case is not expressly covered by the Regulations which deal only with
the case where the minority partners withdraw entirely from the "continuing"
partnership. In all probability the case would be treated as one of a distribution
to the "minority" partners in a non-liquidation transaction. The result will be a
carry-over of basis on the distributed assets, limited only by the basis of the
distributee for his interest.46  Unless money in excess of basis is distributed no
gain would be recognized, 47 but if there is a disproportionate distribution of
assets of any kind ordinary income may result either to partner or firm under
section 751.
Suppose, however, that the parties have proceeded without benefit of coun-
sel, and have entered into an agreement whereby the "majority" partners under-
take to "sell" to the minority partners all of the former's interest in the service
assets, in exchange for a portion of the interest of the "minority" members in
the old firm. It would be quite possible to construe this transaction as involving
a primary distribution of the service assets to the majority partners. Then the
"purchase" of these assets by the minority, in exchange for a part of their interest
in the old firm, would probably result in a recognition of gain to them.4" And,
under section 751, even if there were an overall loss on the "sale" of a part of
their original partnership interests, the minority would suffer ordinary income
on the portion of the gross proceeds attributable to their share of unrealized
appreciation of partnership receivables and inventory.'" Obviously, this differ-
ence in forms should not produce any difference in tax results; and the Commis-
sioner might well consider indicating by Regulation that all transactions having
the effect of a divisive reorganization, in whole or part, shall be treated as such.
The provisions of section 708 (b) (2) (B) are not without possibilities for
improper manipulation. Suppose, for example, that firm ABCD, engaged in
4
6 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 732(a) (2).
4 
T INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §731(a)(1).
48 I.e., if the fair market value of the "service" assets exceeds the basis of the partnership
interest surrendered in exchange therefor.
49 See Regs. § 1.751-1(a)(1)(2); 1.751-1(g), Example 1.
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both sales and service businesses, has heavy losses. It is then possible for
'minority" partners to form a new partnership with family members of the
"majority" partners, and purchase from the prior firm the necessary assets for
conduct of the service business, paying for same out of future profit. The gains
sustained by the old firm will be wiped out by the losses, the assets so transferred
will have a stepped up basis, and (since "majority" partners will participate in
the new firm through their families) there will be no significant changes in over-
all economic interest. This method of avoidance could perhaps be defeated by
judicial decision. But the express Code provision that the "minority" successor
shall be a new firm plays into the hands of persons attempting any such trans-
action.
There are even more blatant possibilities. Suppose that a partnership con-
sists of two husbands and their wives, each family owning a fifty per cent
interest. Assuming that there are current partnership losses, it is possible for
the two families to step-up basis on assets, including receivables (if on a cash
receipts accounting method), and as well to create capital losses for family use.
What would be done, quite simply, would be to distribute all of the firm's
assets in liquidation, taking care that receivables and money alone go to the
wives, the husbands accepting the other property. The results would be as
follows:
(1) If the distribution to the wives, consisting of money and the basis of
receivables, falls short of their bases 'for their interests, then losses will be
recognized."° These would be capital loss.5 Inasmuch as the receivables in a
cash method firm would have a zero basis, there are many cases in which this
artificial capital loss could be created.
(2) The distribution of receivables and inventory items would, to the
extent it was disproportionate, be treated as a sale of such assets by the firm to
the wives. Hence, basis is stepped up, and the gain recognized to the firm can
be wiped out by loss carry-overs. By the same token, basis is stepped up on the
wives' share of "other property," at the cost of a capital gains tax.
(3) The disproportionate distribution of depreciable and capital assets
to the husbands would result in a converse step-up in basis of the remaining
one-half of the assets.
The business would then be reorganized into two firms, each one perhaps
composed of one husband and the other man's wife. Under section 708 (b) (2)
(B), the Commissioner would be virtually obliged to recognize both of these




firms as new entities, since the partners of each would have owned an aggregate
interest in the predecessor which did not exceed fifty per cent. Under the Regu-
lations, the liquidation tax consequences above described would be mandatory.
The courts might prevent this scheme from ever becoming effective, by
applying the "business purpose" test or otherwise. But, then again, they might
not. It can readily be seen that the potential for these unseemly manipulations
arises solely from the "fifty per cent rule" embodied in the statute. A broaden-
ing of the continuity of interest concept in partnership reorganizations would
clearly and unquestionably remove such possibilities.
CONCLUSION
The criticisms here tendered are not unfriendly in purpose. Section 708 is
a pioneer effort, and, like other innovations, requires to be refined in the crucible
of extended discussion. One conclusion emerges fairly clearly, however, even
from a cursory review. Continuity of interest should, in every case, dictate non-
recognition in partnership transactions having as their net effect the mere re-
adjustment of existing business relationships. For the good of the Revenue as
well as in fairness to the taxpayer, the statutory standards of continuity should
be broadened and made flexible.
Responsible observers have noted a disturbing upsurge in gimmickry among
tax men. In part, this is the result of thorough digestion of the many new
provisions which were contained in the 1954 Code. Subchapter K is in many
ways the darkling wood of the Code, but after five years there are undoubtedly
many practicing tax men who now have a thorough grasp of its intricacies. We
can expect that, within a short period, the unremitting quest for tax-saving de-
vices will lead to exploitation of the potentialities of section 708. It would,
therefore, behoove Congress to deal shortly with the problems of that section,
attempting to write a gimmick-proof program more fully effectuating economi-
cally sound reorganization principles.
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